PARTIES
The
Complainant
The
Trustee
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES REFERRED
TO
The
Employer
The
Fund
REVIEW
MEETING
1. Conducted
under the provisions of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993
(Cth) (‘the Complaints Act’) on 24 July 2007 before:
·
Jane Abbott, Presiding Member,
·
Scott Ellis, Member; and
·
Colin Cassidy, Member.
DECISION
UNDER REVIEW
2. On 19 September 2006, the Trustee paid to
the Complainant an early retirement benefit of $491,049.16 (“the decision under
review”). The Complainant asserted that
the payment was incorrectly calculated and was too low.
3. On review, the Trustee affirmed its
original decision.
*Copied
with names deleted for public distribution.
4. The Tribunal conducted the Review on the
papers.
5. Pursuant to s32 of the Complaints Act, it
requested submissions from the parties.
Submissions were received and exchanged and responses invited. The Complainant responded.
6. All documents are retained on the
Tribunal file for record purposes and were copied and distributed to the
parties before the Review meeting.
7. On 2
January 2007 the Complainant lodged a complaint with the
Tribunal. The complaint was that the
Trustee had wrongly excluded two regular payments (“Payments”) received by him
from his Employer when calculating the retirement benefit paid to him.
8. The Fund is a defined benefit fund and
the retirement benefit depends on the amount of the member’s “Final Average
Salary” at the time of retirement.
9. The issue for determination by the
Tribunal is whether the decision under review, that is the payment of the
retirement benefit, was fair and reasonable in its operation in relation to the
Complainant. This depends upon whether
the Trustee’s calculation of the benefit was fair and reasonable. The Tribunal considers that it was: the exclusion
of the Payments from the calculation of the Final Average Salary was fair and
reasonable. The Tribunal affirms the
decision under review.
10. The Tribunal’s reasons are set out below.
11. The relevant background facts of this
matter are not in dispute, although the significance of the facts is in
dispute.
12. The Complainant became a member of the Fund
on 1 November 1987. It appears that the
Complainant commenced employment with the Employer, or one of its predecessor
firms on 17 November 1986. He retired
from employment on 31 August 2006.
14. The first of the Payments (“the Asia Payment”) was the subject of a letter from the Employer to the Complainant dated 5 March 1998 which relevantly reads:
I
am pleased to advise that in accordance with a [Company] decision to provide an
additional salary allowance to those managers involved with [Quality]
implementation, your salary will be increased by a 10% allowance effective from
1 March 1998.
15. It appears that the Asia Payment was
initiated in conjunction with the assumption of a new role in the Asia Pacific
region by the Complainant. It appears
that the Complainant continued to fill that role until his retirement. The Asia Payment continued to be made until
his retirement. The amount of the Asia
Payment was increased from time to time in accordance with salary reviews by
the Employer.
16. The other payment (“the Car Payment”)
reflected an agreement reached between the Complainant and the Employer in
September 2003. The Employer agreed to
make the Car Payment instead of providing a car to the Complainant as part of
his “package”. The Trustee was not
informed of the amount of the Car Payment.
17. The Payments were not included in the
Complainant’s Final Average Salary when calculating his retirement benefit.
18. The Complainant retired from employment
with the Employer on 31 August 2006. The
Trustee paid $491,049.16 on 19 September 2006 to the Complainant’s rollover
fund.
19. The payment was calculated on the basis of
a final salary of $101,800 and a final average salary of $98,800. These figures do not include the
Payments. The Complainant disputes that
these are the correct figures, although there is no dispute that these are the
figures used by the Trustee in its calculation.
20. The Complainant estimated that the effect
of including the Payments in his Final Average Salary would be to increase the
amount of his retirement benefit by $74,000.
21. The provisions of the Trust Deed relevant
to this matter are those which were in force as at 31 August 2006 when the
Complainant ceased employment. The
Tribunal is therefore of the view that the version of the trust deed of the
Fund that is relevant is the trust deed as amended up to and including the
amendment dated 31 May 2005 (‘the Trust Deed’).
22. Schedule B to the Trust Deed sets out the
benefits to which members are entitled in certain circumstances. Clause B3 sets out the benefits on retirement
prior to normal retirement date. It
says:
(a) If a Member retires within 10 years prior
to his or her Normal Retirement Date, the benefit payable shall, subject to
Clause 47, be a pension payable for 5 years certain and life thereafter
determined as equal to one and two-thirds per cent of the Member’s Final
Average Salary multiplied by his or her Years of Membership up to the date of
the Member’s retirement.
(b) In addition to the benefit payable under
paragraph (a), the Trustee shall pay to the Member the amount (if any) standing
to the credit of the Member’s Voluntary Account, Transfer Account
and Rollover Account.
23. “Final
Average Salary” has the following definition:
“Final Average Salary” means the average
of the amounts of the Member’s Annual Salaries at the Review Dates which occur
within the 3 years immediately prior to the Member’s Normal Retirement Date or
(if he or she retires prior to his or her Normal Retirement Date) prior to his
or her date of earlier retirement PROVIDED
THAT, if the Member is within 3 years of his or her Normal Retirement Date
or his or her date of earlier retirement at the date of joining the Service of
the Employer, his or her Annual Salary at the first Review Date in respect of
the Member shall be deemed to have applied at each preceding Review Date.
24. The “Final Average Salary” depends on the
“Annual Salary” of the Member. This term
is also defined:
“Annual Salary” means the annual rate of
Salary of the Member at the relevant Review Date as advised to the Trustee for
the purposes of the Fund.
25. “Salary” has the following meaning in the
Deed:
“Salary” means either:
(a) the remuneration (whether described as
Salary or wages or otherwise) of the Member and includes such fees (if any) as
are payable to the Member in respect of his or her directorship (if any) with
the Employer but does not include payment for overtime or any allowances or
benefits; or
(b) in any special case, such amount as is,
for the purposes of the Fund, agreed upon between the Member and the Employer.
TRIBUNAL’S DELIBERATIONS
26. The Tribunal's role is to determine whether the decision of the Trustee was fair and reasonable in its operation in relation to the Complainant in the circumstances. The issue is not what decision the Tribunal would have made on the evidence before it.
Application of the Superannuation
Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992
27. The amount of the Complainant’s retirement benefit is to be calculated by the Trustee in accordance with the Trust Deed applicable at the time.
28. The Complainant argued that regard should be had to the operation of Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 and, in particular, the definition of “ordinary time earnings” in the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 as explained by Superannuation Guarantee Ruling SGR 94/4. The expression “ordinary time earnings” forms the basis for the calculation of the amount of superannuation guarantee contributions which employers are obliged to make under the Superannuation Guarantee legislation. The Ruling emphasises that regular payments are included in “ordinary time earnings”. It may be assumed that the Payments would fall within the definition of “ordinary time earnings”.
29. Although the SGA Act would have applied to the Complainant and the Employer while the Complainant was employed, the SGA Act does not apply to the present situation. The SGA Act operates to set a minimum standard for superannuation contributions by employers. At present, employers are obliged to make payment of 9% of an employee’s ordinary time earnings as defined by the SGA Act. Provided the contributions made by the Employer to the fund exceed the standard required by the SGA Act, the actual benefits paid to the employee may be calculated as determined by the Trust Deed. The Tribunal was provided with a copy of a certificate from an actuary that the payments made did exceed the minimum requirement.
30. The Tribunal also notes that the expression used in the SGA is “ordinary time earnings” and that this expression has its own definition in the SGA Act. “Earnings” is in some respects a broader expression than “salary”. The scope of “ordinary time earnings” provides no real guidance in understanding the meaning of “salary” or “allowance” in the Trust Deed.
31. The Complainant also argued that the Payments should be included in the calculation because his redundancy entitlements were calculated including the Payments. This has no bearing on the present matter. The basis for those calculations may differ from the definition of “salary”. Further, decisions by the Employer do not bind the Trustee.
Meaning of “Salary” in
the Trust Deed
32. The definition of “Salary” in the Trust Deed excludes “payments for overtime or any allowances or benefits”. The Complainant argued that the Payments were not “allowances” within the meaning of that expression in the definition of “Salary” in the Trust Deed and so ought to have been included as part of “Salary”. He also suggested that the reality of the arrangement between the Complainant and the Employer was that the Payments were part of his salary.
33. The Complainant emphasised the fact that the Payments were not variable on a short term basis, in the way that overtime might be. This argument was probably influenced by the operation of the definition of “ordinary time earnings” in the SGA Act, which includes regular payments but does not include payments which are not related to the hours ordinarily worked by the employee.
34. The Tribunal does not accept this contention. It is not clear that “overtime” is necessarily variable. Parties may enter into agreements which require an employee to work a regular amount of “overtime” each week. Conversely, employees frequently receive “allowances” which remain the same for long periods of time, eg a tool allowance, which is paid to an employee for providing his own tools of trade as long as the employee continues to work “on the tools”.
35. The classic explanation of the meaning of “allowance” is that of Latham CJ in Mutual Acceptance Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1944) 69 CLR 389. Speaking of “allowance”, Latham CJ said at 396 – 397:
When the word is
used in connection with the relation of employer and employee it means in my
opinion a grant of something additional to ordinary wages for the purpose of
meeting some particular requirement connected with the service rendered by the
employee or as compensation for unusual conditions of that service. Expense allowances, traveling allowances, and
entertainment allowance are payments additional to ordinary wages made for the
purpose of meeting certain requirements of a service. Tropical allowances, overtime allowances, and
extra pay by way of “dirt money” are allowances as compensation for unusual
conditions of service.
While the case arose under income tax legislation, the case has been applied many times in the context of employer – employee relations, as indicated in the opening words of the quote. It remains relevant.
36. In the present case, the Payments appear to have been made having regard to the circumstances in which the Complainant carried out his work. In the case of the Asia Payment, the Payment was associated with the amount of travel required of the Complainant. In the case of the Car Payment, the payment was associated with the fact that the Complainant had to provide his own car when working in Australia. The Car Payment is similar to a tool allowance. In this context, the fact that the Payments were made for extended periods of time does not alter the character of the Payments. Because provision of a personal car and overseas travel were required of the Complainant for long periods of time, the Payments continued to be made.
37. The Tribunal does not consider that the fact that the Payments were varied as a result of “salary” negotiations leads to the conclusion that the Payments are not “allowances”. The Asia Payment was expressed as a percentage of salary anyway. The cost of providing a car would vary from time to time. These issues would be addressed when an employee’s overall remuneration was considered.
38. The Complainant suggested that it was not open to the Employer to determine whether a payment was an allowance or formed part of an employee’s salary. There is some force to this argument. An employer could not “label” a payment so as to transform a payment which was really salary into an allowance. At the same time, however, the description used by the employer is relevant to the categorisation of the payment. In the present case, the nature of the Payments suggest that they are allowances. This is confirmed, in the case of the Asia Payment, by the letter of 5 March 1998.
39. The Trustee raised a broader answer to the complaint. The Trustee pointed to the definition of “Annual Salary” in the Trust Deed. The “Annual Salary” forms the basis of the “Final Annual Salary”. The definition of “Annual Salary” refers to the salary “as advised to the Trustee for the purposes of the Fund”. The definition does not say who has the responsibility of advising the Trustee. It may be assumed that the relevant person is the Employer. The Trustee argued that, having been advised of the “Annual Salary”, the Trustee is obliged to use that figure.
40. The Tribunal accepts this argument, within limits. It is not necessary to state comprehensively what those limits might be. By way of example, a trustee could not rely on information as to salary if it knew or had reasonable grounds for believing that the information was wrong, as acknowledged by the Trustee. In the present case, it appears that the information provided to the Trustee was apparently correct. The Trustee was entitled to act on it.
41. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal considers that the decision of the Trustee to pay the retirement benefit in the amount it did was fair and reasonable in its operation to the Complainant in the circumstances.
42. Section 37(6) of the Complaints Act
provides that the Tribunal must affirm the decisions under review if it is
satisfied that their operation in relation to the Complainant was fair and
reasonable in the circumstances. The
Tribunal is so satisfied.
Jane Abbott Jane Abbott, Presiding Member
[signed]
Date of Tribunal signature: 19 September 2007